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Michael W. Carroll* 
 
 My role in this Symposium is to analyze the decisions rendered thus far in A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster.1  I will focus primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision and identify 
some of the implications these decisions will have on copyright law in the Internet context.2  
In particular, I will highlight changes in the law made by the court's treatment of vicarious 





A. Copyright Law 
 
 1. Legal Responses to New Technologies 
 
   In the Twentieth Century, the story of copyright law has been one featuring a series 
of business-to-business arrangements worked out among industry representatives and 
enacted by Congress, with a little fine-tuning along the way.3 As a result, copyright law has 
become quite complex and much of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act") reads like 
a very finely detailed contract.4 
 
   Many of these industry arrangements have been reached after new technologies for 
reproducing, performing, or distributing copyrighted works have entered the marketplace.5 
When cable television began to expand beyond its role of providing traditional community 
access television and began importing distant broadcast <<6>> signals and attracting 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  This article is an edited, and substantially 
extended, transcript of my panel presentation, given on March 10, 2001, while I was an attorney in the 
Washington, D.C. office of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering.  I extend thanks to Colin Rushing for commenting on 
portions of this article, and to my family for their support in my transition to the academy. 
1 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) ("Napster I"), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
("Napster II"). 
2 Three weeks prior to the date of this symposium the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in Napster.  See 
generally 239 F.3d 1004. 
3 See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989) (exploring 
process of drafting copyright legislation). 
4 See id. at 279. 
5 See id. at 328. 




investment capital, television broadcasters perceived a potential competitor.6  As with the 
recording industry's view of Napster, television broadcasters, movie studios and owners of 
music copyrights took the view that cable companies were trying to build a business using 
their intellectual property.7  These parties looked for a theory of copyright infringement that 
would give them the right to enjoin cable television's retransmission of their programming.8 
 
   In copyright terms, a broadcast is a public performance of the copyrighted work, and 
the copyright owner is given the exclusive right to publicly perform audio-visual works.9 
Copyright owners took the position that when cable television stations retransmitted 
broadcast programming, they were engaged in new, unauthorized public performances of 
the works.10  Cable systems argued that they were merely passing along a performance that 
had been sent into the airwaves for all to enjoy.11 The Supreme Court rejected the copyright 
owners' position.12  The Supreme Court, however, aware that a major revision of the 
Copyright Act was gaining momentum on Capitol Hill, invited Congress to revisit the statute 
to consider whether cable system operators should have to pay a royalty for retransmitting 
broadcast programming.13 
 
   The copyright owners persuaded Congress to treat the retransmission of a public 
performance as a new public performance, which, if unauthorized, would infringe their 
rights.  The price for extending that entitlement, however, was a statutory license codified in 
section 111 of the Copyright Act.14 Congress imposed the statutory license to reduce the 
transaction costs involved in clearing rights to broadcast programming and to deprive 
television broadcasters of the ability to stifle the development of cable television by <<7>> 
withholding programming.15 As the cable industry grew, it was television broadcasters who 
sought protection from Congress, which obliged by imposing "must carry" rules on cable 
system operators.16 A similar, though very complicated, combination of litigation and 
                                                 
6 See id. 
7 See id. at 327-28. 
8 See Litman, supra note 3, at 328. 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 17 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1976) 
10 See Litman, supra note 3, at 327. 
11 See id. at 327-28. 
12 See id. at 329. 
13 See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414  (1974) (holding determination of best alternative 
structure for providing compensation to copyright holders beyond competence of court); see also Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401 (1968) (holding accommodation of various 
competing considerations of copyright is for Congress to decide); Litman, supra note 3, at 330-31 n.304 
(describing disruptive effect of Teleprompter on pending legislative negotiations). 
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting requirements to entitlement of statutory license). 
15 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 88-98 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5702-13 (providing 
principal legislative history of 17 U.S.C. § 111); see also Litman, supra note 3, at 331-32 (describing process that 
produced § 111). 
16 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Comms. Comm'n, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997) (discussing and holding 
constitutional "must-carry" provisions). 




legislation has yielded similar results for direct broadcast satellite retransmission of broadcast 
television programming.17 
 
   An important point to recall is that the Supreme Court adopted a reading of the 
Copyright Act of 1909 that favored public access to programming delivered by cable 
systems.18 In doing so, the Supreme Court chose not to fashion a judicial compromise and, 
instead, established a baseline favorable to new technologies for legislative negotiations.  In 
Napster, the Ninth Circuit was offered a similar opportunity, but chose a different course by 
holding Napster liable under a hybrid theory of vicarious liability and declining to use judicial 
power to create a compulsory license.19 
 
 2. Copyrights in Music 
 
   Negotiations over copyright rights in music arguably have been as complex as those 
involving broadcast programming.  Indeed, the lengthiest sections of the Copyright Act are 
those concerning rights in music.  These sections of the Copyright Act are lengthy because 
of the large number of copyright owners and the number of industries with an interest in 
music rights.  The number of copyright owners is a function of the number of composers 
who retain some interest in their copyrights.  The Copyright Act recognizes two copyrights 
in recorded music.  The first is in the underlying musical work, including lyrics, and the 
second is in the recorded rendition of the musical work.20 Any arrangement for distributing 
copies of <<8>> recorded music requires a means of acquiring rights from both sets of 
copyright owners.  Aggregating distribution and reproduction rights is administratively 
difficult, particularly with respect to musical works, because the class of copyright owners is 
large. 
 
   The class of copyright owners in sound recordings is currently small, but has the 
potential to proliferate.  Under current practices, ownership of sound recording copyrights is 
highly concentrated in companies owned by the five largest record companies, who 
collectively sell approximately eighty-five percent of the recorded music sold in the United 
States.21 These companies are the principal plaintiffs in Napster and it is their ownership of 
hundreds of thousands of sound recording copyrights that gives them standing to sue for 
                                                 
17 See 17 U.S.C. § 119 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 17 U.S.C. § 122 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (explaining 
satellite broadcasters have two statutory licenses to retransmit broadcast programming). 
18 See Litman, supra note 3, at 330-31 (discussing Supreme Court decision in Teleprompter). 
19 See Alfred C. Yen, A Preliminary Economic Analysis of Napster: Internet Technology, Copyright Liability, and the 
Possibility of Coasean Bargaining, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 247, 274-77 (2001) (arguing Ninth Circuit should have 
refrained from enjoining Napster). 
20 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting musical lyrics can be both part of musical work and 
independent literary work, and in either case, exclusive rights given to author are same). 
21 See Don Clark & Martin Peers, Can the Record Industry Beat Free Web Music?, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2000, at B1 
(explaining "Big Five" record companies are Sony, Universal Music, Warner Music, EMI and BMG 
Entertainment). 




copyright infringement.22 The "Big Five" record companies obtain ownership in the sound 
recording copyrights by forming contracts with the recording artists.  The precise copyright 
status of this contractual transfer is contested by the record companies and recording 
artists.23 But practices may change, and if the recording artists' interpretation of the 
Copyright Act prevails, the class of sound recording copyright owners will grow substantially 
within the next fifteen years. 
 
   The number of industries with an interest in music also is substantial.  These 
industries include all those involved in music production and distribution, including radio, 
television, cable, satellite, live theater, brick-and-mortar retailers, online retailers, bars, 
restaurants, <<9>> and the list goes on.  If all the interested parties in these industries had 
to clear rights with all of the interested copyright owners through individualized 
negotiations, the transaction costs could potentially thwart the creation of any effective 
means of distributing music.  In response, Congress has crafted a series of statutory licenses 
related to music that permit the production, performance or distribution of music in certain 
circumstances without ex ante negotiation.24  The licenses, on the other hand, require that 
those using copyrighted music contribute to a copyright "kitty" administered by the U.S. 
Copyright Office.  Rights holders are to negotiate over how the kitty is to be divided and, if 
the negotiations break down, the Copyright Office oversees an arbitration proceeding. 
 
   Although the system has been far from perfect, prior to the rise of the Internet and 
the MP3 format, the music industry had resolved the more glaring collective action issues 
and had attained a tenuously stable method of music production and distribution under the 
Copyright Act of 1976.  Rapid technological advances, however, have disrupted traditional 
arrangements within the industry.  The advance that poses the longest-term challenge is the 
spread of distributed computing technology that partially underlies the Napster system. 
 
                                                 
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (authorizing owner of exclusive rights to sue for copyright 
infringement). 
23 See Peter J. Strand, What a Short Strange Trip It's Been: Sound Recordings and the Work Made For Hire Doctrine, 
ENTER. & SPORTS LAWYER, Fall 2000, at 12 (describing amendments to definition of work made for hire).  In a 
recent legislative debacle, Congress passed a bill designed to make only "technical corrections" to recent 
copyright legislation but which also added sound recordings to the list of works that were eligible for treatment 
as works made for hire under 17 U.S.C. § 101(b).  See id.  The effect was to resolve without debate a 
contentious issue within the industry over ownership of sound recording copyrights.  See id.  A number of 
major recording artists responded vociferously, and, within the same session of Congress, the statute was 
amended again to delete sound recordings from the work-for-hire definition.  See id.  
 The issue has periodically popped up on the judicial radar screen.  See  Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 
2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999); Staggers v. Real Authentic Sound, 77 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 1999) (sound 
recordings not with classes of works set forth in § 101(b)).  As of this writing, a group of musicians has filed a 
motion in Napster Seeking resolution of this issue.  See Musicians File Brief Supporting Napster, ZDNet News 
Australia, Nov. 14, 2001, at http:// 
www.zdnet.com.au/newstech/ebusiness/story/0,2000024981,20261852,00.htm. 
24 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114, 115 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 




B. Technological Background 
 
 1. Digital Music and the Rise of MP3 
 
   Napster is a computer application and related service founded on a technology 
known as distributed computing or, more fashionably, peer-to-peer ("P2P") communication.  
The technology is disruptive to distribution schemes dependent on bottlenecks, which 
almost by definition can be exclusively controlled. Napster operates with one bottleneck, and 
it is that feature that led the Ninth Circuit to hold Napster liable for the infringing activities 
of its users. 
 
   Although Napster spread across the Internet faster than wildfire, the technological 
developments that led to Napster's creation were quite gradual compared to other advances 
in the computing field.  Digital audio recording is done through pulse-code modulation 
("PCM"), by which a sound wave is sampled in millisecond increments.  For most audio 
compact discs ("CDs"), the sampling rate <<10>> is 47,000 times per second.25  Each 
sample is encoded with a digital value - a unique set of zeros and ones.  The code is stored 
on magnetic tape and then transferred to any other medium capable of storing digital 
information, most notably CDs. 
 
   PCM was discovered in the late 1930s by an engineer in connection with his work in 
the growing telecommunications industry.26  The technology to store digital data on a 
magnetic drum was developed in the late 1930s to early 1940s and, with the help of captured 
German magnetophones, was further refined by Engineering Research Associates while 
working on encryption research for the Navy.27  Beginning in the 1960s, Philips-Siemens, 
owner of the Polygram record label (one of the Big Five, now part of the Universal Music 
Group), experimented with PCM and optical disks.  This experimentation led to the 
production of the first compact disc player in 1979.28 Sony soon followed introducing its 
first CD player in 1983.29 
 
   The key fact about the development of CD technology is that the recording 
companies relied on the architectural features of the file size and the disk to protect against 
                                                 
25 See MICHAEL FINK, INSIDE THE MUSIC BUSINESS: MUSIC IN CONTEMPORARY LIFE 73-75 (1989). 
26 See Steven E. Schoenherr, The Digital Revolution: Digital Audio Recording Formats Compared, at http:// 
history.acusd.edu/gen/recording/digital.html (explaining how Alec H. Reeves, who worked for International 
Telephone & Telegraph Company in France, disclosed his PCM invention in a French patent in 1938, a British 
patent in 1939 and U.S. Patent #2,272,070 in 1942). 
27 See id.  "The magnetic drum designed by ERA would be used in the computers built in the U.S. over the next 
years by Harvard, IBM, Remington Rand, National Security Administration, National Bureau of Standards."  
Id.  
28 See RUSSELL SANJEK, PENNIES FROM HEAVEN: THE AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 612-13 (1996). 
29 See id. at 613. 




unauthorized copying.  Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, limitations in computing 
power made it seem unlikely to most that the very large amount of data contained on an 
average compact disc, up to 680 megabytes, could be extracted and copied without 
expensive equipment.  This apparent limitation meant that the threat of unauthorized 
copying, a threat not any different from the threat of unauthorized reproduction of vinyl 
long- playing records, would be limited to commercial operations.  Moreover, CD players 
were built to read the data on a compact disc, but they did not have the ability to copy the 
data. 
 
   As we now know, the recording industry's faith in these architectural limitations was 
misplaced.  A group of engineers, the Motion <<11>> Picture Experts Group ("MPEG"), 
working under United Nations' auspices as part of the International Standards Organization, 
carried out its mission to develop a standard for the compression of video and audio data.30 
For audio compression, MPEG identified certain frequencies that were inaudible to the 
human ear.  Using algorithms based on a psychoacoustic model, MPEG developed a 
compression standard that would encode sounds in a way that preserves quality to the 
listener when decoded, while requiring considerably less storage space than used on a 
compact disc.31  Of the audio codecs (short for compression/decompression) MPEG 
developed, the one most familiar is MPEG-1, Audio Layer 3 or MP3. 
 
   The development of MP3 was one of a confluence of factors that greatly reduced the 
architectural barriers to easy, unauthorized reproduction of music files stored on CDs.  In 
addition to the development of the MP3 format and decoding software (MP3 players), 
personal computers increased in power, CD-ROM drives were deployed in most personal 
computers and the Internet expanded rapidly.  The development of audio extraction 
software, called rippers, freed the music files from their discs and made it possible for these 
files to travel the globe.  With widespread expenditure of time and effort, many individuals 
moved large amounts of their music libraries from their CD collection to their personal 
computers. 
 
 2. Arrival of Napster 
 
   The growth and expansion of such technological advances led to file swapping by 
electronic mail, through FTP sites, and the posting of some MP3 files on the Internet.  But, 
the number of files remained limited so that the only remaining barrier to widespread 
unauthorized copying was the difficulty in finding music files on the Internet.  The most 
common way to make files available on the Internet was to store them on servers linked to 
                                                 
30 See Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG), Who We Are, at http:// 
mpeg.telecomitalialab.com/who_we_are.htm (describing makeup of MPEG). 
31 See D. Thom et. al., MPEG Audio FAQ Version 9 MPEG-1 and MPBG-2 BC, at 
http://mpeg.telecomitalialab.com/faq/mp1-aud/mp1-aud.htm#8 (describing how MPEG works). 




the Internet.  Many individuals who had ripped music files from their CDs did not have the 
will or opportunity to publish the files to the Internet in the traditional client-server model. 
 
   Then, a student at Northeastern University, named Shawn Fanning, along with some 
friends, developed an elegantly simple client-side application with back-end server software 
that allowed anyone <<12>> running the client application to search a dynamic directory 
listing files available on other Napster users' hard drives.32  The client-side application is 
called MusicShare, and is freely available for download at http://www.napster.com.33 To use 
MusicShare, a user must register with Napster.  Once the user has registered, MusicShare 
permits the user to connect to a dynamic directory hosted on Napster servers.  The directory 
lists music files in the MP3 format available for download from the hard drives of other 
Napster users who are currently connected to the Napster service.  MusicShare allows users 
to search the directory by file name or by artist.  In addition, a user can create a "hotlist," 
that allows the user to search the files made available by specific Napster users.  When a user 
clicks on a file in the directory to download, the file is copied from one user's computer to 
the other user's computer over the Internet.  Napster does not make copies of the files.  
Rather, each Napster user acts as both a client and a server.  In other words, the machines 
connected to the Napster service act as peers, bringing distributed computing to the masses.  
On its website, Napster portrayed its peer-to-peer technology as the basis for creating a new 
kind of musical community.  To the recording industry, that "community" was more like a 
den of thieves. 
 
 3. Prelude to a Lawsuit 
 
   While certain members of the entertainment industry sought to portray Napster, Inc. 
and its founders as evil incarnate, a number of other musicians and copyright owners had a 
more ambivalent, or even positive, reaction to the rampant file sharing that had taken the 
Internet by storm.  Some bands, for example, were gaining unprecedented notoriety.34 Songs 
that were on out-of-print records resurfaced.  Counter to those who claimed that file sharing 
would destroy record sales, CD sales had increased over pre-Napster levels.  Indeed, a 
compilation of hits from the Beatles was released in November 2000, and promptly shot to 
number one on the Billboard <<13>> charts and sold 2.5 million copies in its first month, 
                                                 
32 See Giacario Varanini, Q&A: Napster Creator Shawn Fanning, ZDNet News, Mar. 3, 2000, at http:// 
www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2455495,00.html (interviewing Shawn Fanning, whose nickname 
was "Napster"). 
33 See OldVersion.com, at http://www.oldversion.com/napster.shtml (providing prior versions of MusicShare 
because, as of this writing, MusicShare no longer is available for download from Napster site). 
34 See Richard Menta, Did Napster Take Radiohead's New Album to Number 1?, MP3 Newswire.net, Oct. 28, 
2000, at http:// www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2000/radiohead.html (noting that Radiohead, which makes 
intelligent, non-standard pop music that does not generally top charts, saw its album Kid A, released on 
Napster prior to its official release, shoot to number one). 




notwithstanding the fact that all of the songs on the album were readily available on Napster 
before the album's release.35 
 
   But, without a doubt, file sharing on Napster has resulted in some displaced sales.  
And, as more people purchase CD burners or portable MP3 players, devices that make 
digital music increasingly portable, the prospect for a greater diminution of sales seems 
almost certain.  Thus, as was widely expected, Napster got sued . . . and sued . . . and sued.  
Metallica, Dr. Dre and all of the major recording labels sued Napster.  Virtually all the major 
players in the recording industry sued Napster. Although a few artists sued Napster, the 
principal plaintiffs were those who own interests in the sound recording copyrights in 
recorded music.  Yet, the people engaged in the copying and distribution of the music files 
are individual Napster users.  Napster, Inc. does not host copies of any music files on its 
servers, which means that it does not directly infringe any of the copyright owners' exclusive 
rights. But the copyright owners did not want to sue individual users, who also were fans and 
customers, even though it has been individual users who have been directly responsible for 
the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of copyrighted music. 
 
   Therefore, just as broadcasters and other copyright owners had done with cable 
television, record labels began to inquire into which legal theories could de used to shut 
down the service.  Interestingly, notwithstanding the highly political nature of copyright law 
and the numerous amendments that copyright owners have obtained to strengthen their 
respective hands in litigation, no provision in the Copyright Act specifically provides a cause 
of action against third parties who facilitate copyright infringement.  For years, however, 
courts have recognized third-party liability for copyright infringement.36 Over time, these 
theories have been described doctrinally as "contributory infringement" and "vicarious 
infringement."37  To prevail on either of these theories, the plaintiff must first prove that the 
defendant is aiding aparty that has, or is, <<14>> engaged in direct copyright infringement.  
In Napster, for example, the record labels had to prove that individual users were infringers, 
and thus the rights of millions of Napster users were decided in abstentia. 
 
   The absence of individual defendants from the lawsuit is problematic for two 
reasons.  First, the people who were directly responsible for the alleged wrong were not 
called upon to account for their conduct.  This failure to hold individuals accountable is 
problematic in terms of the interaction between legal norms and social norms and the 
                                                 
35 See David Basham, Beatles Get Back to #1, MTV NEWS, Dec. 13, 2000, at 
http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1424531/20001213/story.jhtml (explaining Beatles rise to top of 
Billboard charts). 
36 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 (1984) (recognizing third-party liability for 
copyright infringement).  As a formal matter, the theories of third-party liability arguably reflect interpretation 
of 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)'s imposition of liability on "anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner," but as a practical matter, the theories are better understood as federal common law. Id. at 
433. 
37 See Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 




ongoing negotiation over intellectual property rights and responsibilities in the digital era.  
Second, had individual Napster users been present and had they advanced their own fair use 
claims, the courts would have been forced to engage in a more nuanced analysis.  Overall, 
however, the outcome would not have been much different had any individual users been 
sued.  Individual Napster users could have participated as amici or could have volunteered to 
be joined as defendants (an unlikely proposition), and Napster had considerable incentives to 
assert the rights of its users because a defendant to a claim of third party liability is entitled 
to assert any defenses available to the alleged direct infringer. 
 




   The Ninth Circuit's analysis tracked the parties' arguments.38  Adjudicating the rights 
of the absent Napster users, the court first held that users of the Napster system who upload 
and download copies of music files infringe the copyrights owned by music publishers and 
record companies.39 Second, using Napster either to "sample" new music or to "space- shift" 
music from their CDs to their computers is not protected by the Copyright Act's fair use 
provision.40  These holdings rely, in part, on a finding that the massive scale of file exchange 
enabled by Napster constitutes a "commercial" use of the copyrighted works, 
notwithstanding the fact that no money changes hands among users of the Napster service.41 
 
  In Napster, the court held that Napster is not legally responsible for the infringing 
activities of its users merely because it has supplied software and operates a computer system 
that is capable of <<15>> facilitating the unauthorized copying of copyrighted works.42  In 
reaffirming and extending the Supreme Court's holding in Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 
Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that when a software or computer system is capable of 
"substantial non-infringing uses," the distributor or operator of such a system must have 
specific knowledge that the software or system is being used for infringing purposes before 
the distributor or operator can be held liable.43  The court affirmed the district court's finding 
that Napster had sufficient actual knowledge of infringement such that it is likely to be 
found liable.44 
 
   The court further held that, because Napster had reserved the right to deny users 
access to the service and had the ability to search its directory of file names, Napster had an 
                                                 
38 See generally Napster II, 239 F. 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
39 See id. at 1018-19. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at 1021. 
42 See id 
43 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021. 
44 See id. at 1020. 




obligation to police its system.45 Because Napster users name their own files,46 Napster's duty 
to police is limited to searching its index of file names to detect titles of copyrighted music.47  
The court implied that Napster's obligation is to block access to all the files of a user who 
posts copyrighted music rather than just access to the files containing copyrighted music. 
 
   Finally, the court rejected two of Napster's statutory defenses.  First, the court held 
inapplicable a provision of the Audio Home Recording Act.48 The Audio Home Recording 
Act immunizes the manufacturer of a "digital audio recording device" or a "digital audio 
recording medium" to the extent that such device or medium is used noncommercially by 
consumers to make copies.49  Second, the court declined to decide whether Napster was 
eligible for a safe harbor from monetary liability for search engines set forth in the Online 
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act.50 
 
<<16>> B. Direct Infringement 
 
   The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty upholding the district court's finding that 
individual Napster users were engaged in direct copyright infringement of the plaintiffs' 
rights of public distribution and reproduction.51  According to the court, users who sign on 
to Napster and invite anyone to copy files are publicly distributing or authorizing the public 
distribution of that work.52 Additionally, when a user asks (in binary code) to copy a song 
                                                 
45 See id. at 1023-24 
46 See id. at 1024. 
47 See id. 
48 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1024; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1008  (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ("We agree with the district 
court that the Audio Home Recording Act does not cover the downloading of MP3 files to computer hard 
drives."). 
49 See id. 
50 See id. at 1024; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  This section was enacted as part of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") in 1998.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
51 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014. 
52 See id.  The Ninth Circuit's holding on infringement of the distribution right requires greater explication in 
light of the text of the Copyright Act.  According to the Act, "the owner of copyright under this title has the 
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ... (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106.  The Court held simply that, "Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to 
copy violate plaintiff's distribution rights."  Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014 (emphasis added). Uploading a file 
name is not a distribution of a phonorecord by sale or other transfer of ownership.  And, as the court 
acknowledges, the copy that is "distributed" is made by the Napster user requesting the file. 
 Perhaps the court meant that those Napster users who permit others to request copies of data from 
their hard drives are distributing phonorecords without authorization.  Such distributions, however, may not 
involve a "sale or other transfer of ownership" because, arguably, the alleged distributor never had an 
ownership interest in the copy received by the requesting user.  See David L. Hayes, Advanced Copyright Issues on 
the Internet, 7 TEX. INT. PROP. L.J. 1, 37 (1998).  If this understanding of digital mitosis is correct, then the 
copyright owner's right to authorize "rental, lease, or lending" also would not be infringed because the three 
uses are defined by retention of an ownership interest in the copy.  




file, the user infringes the copyright owner's right of reproduction.  Having found a prima 
facie case of direct infringement, the court addressed <<17>> whether Napster users were 
engaged in fair use of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works.53 
 
C. Fair Use 
 
   Napster argued that its users were making fair use of the music available on its 
system.54 Its first asserted fair use was "sampling."55  In essence Napster argued, Look . . . 
what are people doing?  They're not really replacing sales; they just want to see what's out 
there, right?  This is the most exciting new development in music distribution in all time.  
Suddenly all the music in the world, practically, is available at your fingertips.  No more 
rifling through the bins in the used record store to find this out of print music, it's right 
there, push a button and you've got it.  So people are sampling music. They're just 
downloading it to listen to it, then they're going to go out and buy it.  No harm to the 
market, it's fair use.56 
 
   Napster also argued that its users were merely space-shifting music they already 
owned.57 In particular, Napster argued that people who owned CDs, but did not have the 
hardware and software necessary to convert the files on their CDs into the MP3 format, 
used the Napster service as a means to do so.58 
                                                                                                                                                 
   Numerous other courts have held that one who exposes a file to the Internet or to subscribers of a 
bulletin board system is liable for distributing any infringing copies made by those requesting the file.  See, e.g., 
Marobie- FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. 
v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 550-53 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 
1552, 1555- 59 (M.D. Fla. 1993).  But the most thoughtful early decision was skeptical. See Religious Tech. Ctr. 
v. Netcom Online Comm. Serv., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1371-72 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[O]nly the subscriber should 
be liable for causing the distribution of plaintiffs' work, as the contributing actions of the BBS provider are 
automatic and indiscriminate.").  
   Like these courts, the Ninth Circuit stretched the definition of the distribution right to keep the right 
meaningful in the digital age.  The courts could have accepted the fact that because digital technology operates 
by making multiple copies, the reproduction right has displaced the distribution right in many contexts.  In 
Napster, as in the cases just cited, the court could have, and perhaps should have, held that one who exposes a 
file to the Internet, so that others may make infringing copies of the file, is liable as a contributory infringer of 
the copyright owner's right of reproduction.  The Napster users who make files available know or should know 
that others will copy the files and exposing the files to other Napster users for such purpose is a material 
contribution to the making of such copies. 
53 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1014. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 1018. 
56 See id. 
57 See id. at 1019 ("Napster also maintains that space-shifting is a fair use."). 
58 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019.  Napster also advanced as a third fair use the authorized distribution of new 
artists' music through the Napster service that the plaintiffs did not Seek to enjoin.  See id.  As a matter of 
clarification, if the distribution is authorized, it is not a fair use, it is a non-infringing use because it is not even 
prima facie infringing. See id. 





   Fair use analysis turns on a number of factors: (1) the purpose and character of the 
use, (2) the nature of the use, (3) the portion of the copyrighted work used and (4) the effect 
on the market for the copyrighted work.59 Normally, courts address how an asserted use 
fares under these factors.  In this case, neither the district court nor the appellate court began 
by addressing the asserted uses under these factors.60  Rather, the mode of analysis employed 
by both courts reflects the problematic aspects of having allowed Napster <<18>> to act as 
a proxy for all of its users with regard to their fair use rights.  Both courts applied the four 
factors to the Napster service in the aggregate and then to the specific asserted fair uses of 
sampling and space-shifting.61 
 
   Under the first factor, the Ninth Circuit found that the purpose and character of file 
sharing was commercial notwithstanding the fact that no money changes hands among 
Napster users. 62 The court observed that "[d]irect economic benefit is not required to 
demonstrate a commercial use.  Rather, repeated and exploitative copying of copyrighted 
works, even if the copies are not offered for sale, may constitute a commercial use."63  Under 
the second factor, the court found that because the copyrighted works were creative, the 
copyrights were thick and entitled to robust protection.64 Under the third factor, the court 
held that the portion of the copyrighted works generally copied by users were the whole 
works.65 Under the fourth factor, both courts held that Napster's use, in the aggregate, 
harmed the market for CD sales among college students and acted as a barrier to entry into 
the new market for digital downloads.66 
 
   Turning to the asserted fair uses, the district court and the Ninth Circuit used their 
respective analyses of aggregate Napster use to color their respective analyses of the asserted 
fair uses.  "Sampling" appears to have been understood to mean any download made with 
the intent to consider the purchase of a song, either as a single or bundled with other songs 
on a CD.  Both courts understood "sampling" use to include a user's retaining a copy of an 
MP3 file even after the user has decided not to purchase the song.67  With that 
understanding, the Ninth Circuit upheld Judge Patel's determination that sampling was a 
commercial use presumed to harm the market because record companies regulate the 
                                                 
59 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (listing factors used in fair use analysis). 
60 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015-17; Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13. 
61 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1015-17; Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13 
62 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018. 
63 Id.; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (defining  "financial gain" to "include[ ] receipt, or expectation 
of receipt, of anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works"). 
64 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1016 (citing Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913). 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 1016-17 (citing Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913-15). 
67 See id. at 1018 ("Napster users download a full, free and permanent copy of the recording."); Napster I, 114 F. 
Supp. 2d at 913 ("[S]ampling on Napster amounts to obtaining permanent copies of songs that users would 
otherwise have to purchase ...."). 




availability of promotional free copies and charge Internet sites for use of promotional 
<<19>> samples.68  In the alternative, the court held that even if sampling is non-
commercial, the fact that users could retain a "sampled" copy of music permanently harmed 
the markets for CDs and for digital downloads.69  Finally, the court brushed aside Napster's 
argument that it did not harm the market because Napster use actually increased CD sales.  
Specifically, the court held that even if CD sales increased, the copyright holder is entitled to 
determine how to increase sales.70 
 
   The Ninth Circuit also quickly dismissed space-shifting as a fair use.71  The court 
appeared to understand "space-shifting" as involving two different activities, but did not 
clarify how each was not a fair use.  At first, the court said "[s]pace-shifting occurs when a 
Napster user downloads MP3 music files in order to listen to music he already owns on 
audio CD."72 Presumably, this description means downloading an MP3 file from another 
Napster user's computer.  The court also appeared to understand space- shifting to involve a 
Napster user making his or her own ripped files available on Napster so that he or she could 
access the files from another machine.73  This understanding is an unlikely understanding of 
space-shifting because it would require the user to have his or her home machine turned on 
and connected to Napster when he or she tried to access the files from a remote machine.  
In either case, the court held this use to be infringement because the use involved making 
the files available to the world and permitting other users to copy the files.74 
 
   Both courts' analyses of fair use could have been more careful.  Neither court started 
by addressing how Napster users use the service.75  The evidence appears to show that 
Napster is many things to many people.  In the context of this case, Napster raised the fair 
use defenses of its users that it thought might best shield it from liability. This approach, 
however, left some uses by some users unanalyzed.  Even with the asserted fair uses, both 
courts should have begun by analyzing whether the uses were fair on their own terms and 
then analyzed the proportion of Napster use that could be characterized as sampling or 
space-shifting.  Had the district court and the appellate court used this approach, the ruling 
may <<20>> have better articulated the balance between the rights of copyright owners and 
users that section 107 is intended to strike. 
 
   The discussion of sampling by both courts shares two flaws.  First, the definition of 
sampling appears to have been overinclusive, sweeping in permanent downloads that do not 
                                                 
68 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018. 
69 See id. 
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73 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1019. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 1015-17; Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 912-13. 




result in a sale.76 This definition suited Napster's needs because without it, Napster would 
not have had a plausible argument that it was not liable for its users' activities.  But the 
definition gave short shrift to the rights of conscientious Napster users who may have 
deleted files after deciding not to purchase the music contained therein.  Had sampling been 
limited to those downloads that a user either keeps because he or she has purchased the 
song(s) or deletes after having, within a reasonable time, decided not to purchase the music, 
a strong argument can be made under the four factors of section 107 that such use is a non-
commercial use which does not harm the market for music sales.77 
 
   Similarly, in its brief discussion of space-shifting, the Ninth Circuit did not squarely 
address whether it is a fair use to copy from a remote source a music file containing recorded 
music that one owns in another format.78  Had discussion of space-shifting focused on that 
issue, the answer again might have been that such copying is fair.  If either court had 
followed this suggested analytical framework, Napster would not have been held immune 
from liability.  Almost certainly the asserted fair uses do not characterize the majority of 
downloads that have taken place on Napster.  The district court, for example, came to this 
conclusion with respect to space-shifting.79 The courts could have held that even though 
Napster facilitates some fair uses of recorded music, most users turn to Napster's service for 
copyright infringement.  Such a holding would <<21>> have recognized the beneficial 
aspects of the technology while still requiring analysis of whether Napster could be held 
liable for contributory or vicarious infringement. 
 
D. Third-Party Liability 
 
   The Ninth Circuit's analysis of contributory and vicarious liability is interesting and 
problematic on a number of levels.  The court's analysis, for example, could be seen as an 
attempt to address the concerns of two important constituencies.  As is well known, the 
Ninth Circuit covers a number of western states, predominantly California.  Two California 
constituencies had keen interests in this case: (1) technology companies based in Northern 
California, and (2) the entertainment industry based in Southern California.  In its discussion 
                                                 
76 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1018. 
77 The recording industry would likely counter that such use would still harm the market for distribution of 
promotional copies and the still- undeveloped market for rentals of digital music.  Cf. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 
1018 ("[E]ven authorized temporary downloading of individual songs is commercial in nature.").  The proper 
resolution of this dispute depends upon one's view of the harm-to-a-potential-market analysis under the fourth 
fair use factor. 
78 The question of whether a user who requests a music file from remote source is engaged in fair use is distinct 
from whether a service that makes and distributes unauthorized copies for the purpose of serving as such a 
remote location is engaged in fair use.  See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351-
52 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (asking whether service that makes and distributes unauthorized copies for purpose of 
serving remote location is engaged in fair use and  rejecting fair use defense of such  service). 
79 See Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916 (holding "[d]efendant fails to show that space-shifting constitutes 
commercially significant use of Napster"). 




of contributory infringement, the Ninth Circuit went out of its way to give some comfort to 
the manufacturers of new technologies.80  But any sense of comfort quickly evaporated after 
the court announced its expansive understanding of vicarious liability.81 As a result, the 
Ninth Circuit muddled the law. 
 
 1. Contributory Infringement 
 
   Liability under the doctrine of "contributory infringement" requires that a third party 
have actual or constructive knowledge that another is engaged in copyright infringement and 
that the third party has induced, caused, or materially contributed to the other's infringing 
conduct.82  The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty finding that Napster materially contributed 
to the infringing activity of its users by connecting its users through the distribution of 
MusicShare and by the operation of the directory of users' files.83  Of greater consequence, is 
the court's discussion of the knowledge requirement.  The plaintiffs provided evidence that 
Napster executives knew that users were engaged in copyright infringement.84 Accordingly, 
the plaintiffs argued that because MusicShare was designed to facilitate copying of music 
files in the MP3 format, Napster should be held to know that users would use, and were 
using, its software to make infringing copies of copyrighted music.85  In response to the 
plaintiffs, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding that <<22>> Napster had actual knowledge 
of infringement; but it also analyzed whether Napster had constructive knowledge of 
infringement.86 
 
   In attempting to deny constructive knowledge, Napster relied on Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.,87 which held that a manufacturer of a videocassette recorder does 
not have constructive knowledge that its product is used for copyright infringement if the 
product is capable of substantial non- infringing uses.88  Extending the Supreme Court's 
holding in Sony, the Ninth Circuit held that "[w]e . . . will not impute the requisite level of 
knowledge to Napster merely because peer-to-peer file sharing technology may be used to 
infringe plaintiffs' copyrights."89  More importantly, the Ninth Circuit held that Sony 
immunity from constructive knowledge is based on a "system's capabilities," which in turn 
requires analysis of current use and potential non-infringing uses.90 
 
                                                 
80 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1021-22. 
81 See id. at 1023-24. 
82 See id. at 1019-20. 
83 See id. at 1022. 
84 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Napster I, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 918, 920-21 n.6). 
85 See id. at 1021. 
86 See id. at 1021-22. 
87 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
88 See id. at 418. 
89 Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436). 
90 See id. at 1021. 




   In an interesting move, the Ninth Circuit supported its holding with analysis of 
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,91 an earlier 
case involving the potential liability of an Internet service provider and a bulletin board 
system operator.92  The Ninth Circuit then restated and expanded its holding by declaring 
that "absent any specific information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system 
operator cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of the 
system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material."93 
 
   In the first iteration of its holding, the Ninth Circuit extended Sony immunity to 
"peer-to-peer file sharing technology."94  Presumably, this holding includes MusicShare, on 
the theory that the court looked at a computer application as a software device similar to a 
VCR.  In its second iteration, however, the court's holding extended beyond a computer 
application to a complete system over which infringing activity may take place.95  This 
extension by the Ninth Circuit favors one who constructs such a system; operating such a 
system, however, is risky business indeed. 
 
 <<23>>2. Vicarious Liability 
 
   The court's treatment of vicarious liability is the more important aspect of the 
holding and the more worrisome piece for Internet clients. Vicarious liability for copyright 
infringement is imposed when a third party has the right and ability to supervise an 
infringer's conduct and the third party receives a financial benefit from the infringing 
conduct.96 Because this is a judicial doctrine, the standards for vicarious liability have been 
articulated through a common law process.  Vicarious liability in the common law tradition 
starts with the employer/employee relationship.97 It is a basic form of respondeat superior.98  
It is based on the notion that if one owns a business and employees acting within the scope 
of their employment are engaged in infringement, the owner will be held liable. 
 
   The courts, however, split on the scope of vicarious liability in other contexts.  On 
one hand, a line of cases developed which said that absentee landlords who rent property 
where infringement occurs, such as a record store selling infringing phonorecords, will not 
be held liable.99  In immunizing this type of absentee landlord from liability, courts reasoned 
that even though the landlord might have theoretical control over what is going on and 
                                                 
91 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
92 See id. at 1374. 
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94 Id. at 1020-21. 
95 See id. at 1021-22. 
96 See id. at 1022. 
97 See, e.g., Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142, 148 (Ind. 1999). 
98 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 
1996), which discusses vicarious liability for copyright infringement). 
99 See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262 (discussing background cases on vicarious liability for copyright infringement). 




might be getting some benefit from the sales of infringing records (because it helps keep the 
tenant solvent), such control and benefit is too tenuous to impose liability.100 On the other 
hand, a separate line of cases, the so-called "dance hall" cases, also developed.101 Under these 
cases, the operator of a dance hall would hire a band that would play copyrighted songs 
without a license.  Courts viewed the "dance hall" cases as similar to the employer/employee 
relationship because the dance hall owner can control the band and the owner receives a 
financial benefit from the band playing the latest hits and drawing people in to spend money 
at the club. 
 
   Any lawyer should understand the importance of analogies in common law 
lawmaking.  It may have been that the Ninth Circuit <<24>> would have had to reach back 
to some of these older cases to decide whether Napster is more like an absentee landlord or 
like a dance hall operator.  Had these been the only available analogies, Napster quite likely 
would have fallen on the "dance hall" side of the divide; but the Ninth Circuit might also 
have explained what the operator of a computer system must do to be treated as a mere 
landlord. Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 
Inc.,102 a recent case in which the Ninth Circuit had held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for 
vicarious infringement against the operator of a flea market at which bootlegged recordings 
were sold.103  Because of the procedural posture in that case, the court was obliged to assume 
the worst about the flea market operator.  After reviewing the precedents just mentioned, 
the Ninth Circuit held in Fonovisa that the flea market operator supervised the distribution 
of infringing recordings because it had the right to "control and patrol" its premises, along 
with a contractual right to evict the vendors for any reason.104  Further, the operator received 
a financial benefit because it received revenue from the vendors and patrons involved in the 
infringing distributions.105  To the Ninth Circuit, Napster looked a lot like a flea market 
involving barter, rather than a cash exchange.106 
 
   In examining the supervision prong of vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit adopted a 
formalist stance.  The court concluded that Napster had the right to supervise its users 
because, in its MusicShare license agreement, Napster had retained a right to refuse service 
or terminate a user's account for any reason, including a belief that a user is violating 
applicable law.107  The court held that "[t]o escape imposition of vicarious liability, the 
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101 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 n.18 (1984). 
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104 See id. at 262-63. 
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reserved right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent."108  The only silver lining for 
<<25>> the technology community is that the court limited Napster's duty to supervising 
user activity within the given architecture of the Napster system.109  The Ninth Circuit 
determined that Napster's "right to police" extended to searching the contents of its file 
directory and terminating user accounts.110  The court, however, did not explain how 
Napster was to police its file directory.  Rather, the Ninth Circuit left this matter to the 
district court. 
 
   With regard to the financial benefit prong, it is fair to ask: "How does Napster make 
its money?"  Right now Napster does not.  In fact, there are people who say: "Hey, look it's 
the Soviet Union . . . it's going to collapse under its own weight - the business model doesn't 
make sense."  But in our attention economy, getting the attention of fifty million registered 
users is something that you probably can convert into money either through advertising or 
subscriptions.  In the short run, Napster had received substantial investment capital.  Thus, 
the Ninth Circuit had little difficulty finding that the availability of copyrighted music drew 
users to Napster and that Napster received a financial benefit from such increases in its 
userbase.111 
 
 3. Analysis 
 
   The Ninth Circuit's contributory infringement analysis is in some tension with its 
vicarious liability analysis.  It is possible to build a system that enables infringing activity 
without being liable, but as soon as you operate such a system, you must exercise your 
supervisory authority to the "fullest extent" or you will be held liable. 
 
   Without fanfare, the Ninth Circuit appears to have fashioned new law under the 
doctrine of vicarious liability.  The court held that "[t]o escape imposition of vicarious 
liability, the reserved right to police must be exercised to its fullest extent.  Turning a blind 
eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to liability."112  These 
statements are doctrinally incoherent.  As the court had recognized, vicarious liability is an 
"outgrowth" of the doctrine of respondeat superior.113 Like respondeat superior, vicarious 
liability for copyright infringement turns on the relationship between <<26>> the 
                                                                                                                                                 
1013-18 (2000) (discussing conflicting lines of authority concerning interpretation of control prong of vicarious 
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113 See id. at 1022 (citing Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)). 




defendant and the direct infringer.114  Liability is strict and no exception applies to the 
supervisory party who tries hard.115 In the employer/employee relationship, for example, the 
employer is strictly liable for the employee's infringing conduct regardless of how carefully 
the employer supervises the employee.  It is the power, or exercise of the power, to 
supervise that gives rise to the imposition of strict liability.116 
 
   The policy for imposing strict liability for copyright infringement on supervisory 
parties is twofold.  First, strict liability is to provide potential plaintiffs with greater assurance 
of receiving a remedy by making the supervisory party the insurer of its supervisees' 
infringing acts.117 The plaintiff may not recover doubly from the supervisor and the 
supervisee for the supervisee's infringements, but the plaintiff may choose from which 
defendant she may recover.118 
 
   Second, the aim of vicarious liability is to provide an incentive to supervisory parties 
to exercise their supervisory power responsibly.  At first blush, the imposition of strict 
liability is a disincentive to careful supervision because the costs of careful supervision do 
not yield the benefit of a defense to liability.  In practice, however, the specter of strict 
liability provides an incentive for the supervisory party to exercise its power to reduce the 
incidence of infringing acts for which it will be held strictly liable.119  The incentive <<27>> 
justification for vicarious liability makes sense only when the supervisory party's power to 
control the infringing behavior is such that it can meaningfully reduce the incidence rate of 
infringing acts committed by its supervisees. 
 
   The purpose of vicarious liability, therefore, is to provide an incentive for the 
supervisory party to police its supervisees "to the fullest extent" that the supervisor deems 
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efficient in light of its potential liability for copyright infringement, but the insurance 
rationale provides that such policing does not immunize the supervisory party from liability 
in the event that infringement occurs.  Yet, the Ninth Circuit appears to have announced 
that such immunity would be available where a court determines that the supervisory party 
has policed its supervisees to the "fullest extent."120 
 
   Adding confusion to its vicarious liability analysis is the court's statement that 
"[t]urning a blind eye to detectable acts of infringement for the sake of profit gives rise to 
liability."121  Under traditional vicarious liability analysis, the act of "turning a blind eye" 
would be of no moment because it relates to the defendant's knowledge.  Constructive 
knowledge closes the loophole that would encourage willful ignorance were liability to turn 
on actual knowledge.  Constructive knowledge, however, applies to contributory 
infringement, not vicarious liability.  The courts that have drawn a clear doctrinal distinction 
between vicarious and contributory infringement have made clear that the supervisory 
party's lack of knowledge of its supervisees' infringing activities, whether caused by the 
supervisor's willful blindness or by the surreptitious actions of crafty supervisees, is 
immaterial to the imposition of vicarious liability.122 
 
   The Ninth Circuit's opinion poses a quandary for attorneys advising Internet-based 
clients about the risks of vicarious liability for their users' infringing activities.  Attorney and 
client should proceed cautiously if they intend to rely on the new safe harbor from vicarious 
liability that the Ninth Circuit appears to have created.  It is possible that the court did not 
intend to create a safe harbor at all.  In subsequent cases, the court may choose to 
characterize its <<28>> offer of immunity to the supervisory party who fully supervises as 
errant dicta.  But there is some reason to believe that the court meant what it said.  The tone 
of the opinion, and the court's choice to extend Sony's protections, evidence an attempt to 
fashion a compromise between the interests of the technology community and the 
entertainment industry.  In the spirit of compromise, the court chose to cast the specter of 
vicarious liability quite wide across the Internet by applying the doctrine to any system 
operator that retains in its Terms of Service or other statement of policy a right to exclude 
users from communicating with its servers.  To offset the sizable costs imposed by allocating 
the risks of liability so broadly, the Ninth Circuit appears to have created a new exception to 
the doctrine of vicarious liability available to third parties that exercise the power to exclude 
copyright infringers to the fullest extent. 
 
   Finally, there is an interesting subtext involving doctrines of real property, intellectual 
property and privacy in the evolution of vicarious liability.  In the traditional landlord-tenant 
                                                 
120 See Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2001). 
121  Id. at 1023. 
122 See, e.g., Shapiro Bernstein & Co., 316 F.2d at 308 ("The imposition of liability upon the Green Company, 
even in the absence of an intention to infringe or knowledge of infringement, is not unusual."); see also 3 
NIMMER supra, note 118, at § 12.04[A][1] & n.20 (collecting cases). 




case, courts have held the landlord immune based, in part, on an understanding of the 
relationship between landlords and tenants.123  A leasehold is more than a contractual right; it 
is an interest in the real property, an exclusive right to possess. That exclusive right provides 
the tenant with certain expectations of privacy, notwithstanding a landlord's contractual right 
to enter the premises. Implicitly, courts appeared to have recognized that imposing vicarious 
liability on landlords would be undesirable both because most landlords do not meddle in 
their tenants' business, and because imposing such liability would effectively require 
landlords to so meddle.  In Fonovisa, the district court accepted, and the Ninth Circuit 
rejected, a view of the flea market vendors as tenants, with certain rights to conduct their 
business as they saw fit within their assigned plot.  The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by 
the analogy because the swap meet operator, unlike a commercial landlord, retained a 
unilateral right to evict for any reason, and, unlike many commercial landlords, it actively 
patrolled its premises.  Conceivably, the result may have been different had the operator 
extended certain "property" rights to the vendors.  Such a different result may have 
developed because the rights in real property help establish an expectation of privacy that is 
in conflict with the desire of the owners <<29>> of intellectual property who seek to 
impose liability on the landlord. 
 
   The result in Napster I and Napster II would probably not have been different had 
Napster constrained itself contractually from terminating user accounts, or perhaps given 
users a role in managing the system.  Such a result can be attributed to the disruption in 
intellectual property markets caused by Napster's technology and because real property 
metaphors are culturally less compelling when the property involved is access to, and space 
on, computers. But it may be that web hosts would have better luck analogizing themselves 
to traditional landlords, particularly if the tenants obtain property-like rights analogous to a 
traditional tenant's. 
 
E. Statutory Defenses 
 
   Napster also asserted statutory defenses under the Audio Home Recording Act and 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. 
 
 1. Audio Home Recording Act 
 
   First, Napster asserted the Audio Home Recording Act as a statutory defense.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that § 1008, a provision of a 1992 amendment to the Copyright Act that 
governs digital audiotape, did not shield Napster.124 This provision immunizes the 
manufacturer of a "digital audio recording device" or a "digital audio recording medium" to 
the extent that such device or medium is used noncommercially by consumers to make 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., 3 NIMMER supra note 118, at § 12.04[A][1] & n.23 ("[T]he lessor of a theater is not liable merely by 
virtue of that status for infringing performances that may occur in the theater."). 
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copies.125 Relying on its prior holding in Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond 
Multimedia Systems, Inc.,126 the Ninth Circuit held that personal computers are not "digital 
music recording devices" and that computers do not make "digital music recordings."127 
 
 2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
 
   Napster's final statutory argument relied on Title II of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act ("DMCA").128  Section 512 provides limitations on monetary liability ("safe 
harbors") that are defined in relation to the function performed by an online service provider 
in <<30>> connection with the infringing activities.129  Rather than relying on the safe 
harbor established for service providers acting as search engines, Napster argued that it was 
like a general backbone Internet Service Provider who only makes copies by sending 
information from point A to B and does not really pay attention to what is happening.130  
The district court rejected this argument, and the Ninth Circuit did not address it.131 
 
   The DMCA also provides a safe harbor for search engines. Section 512(d) 
immunizes from monetary liability a "service provider" that "links users to an online location 
containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using information location tools, 
including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or hypertext link."132  That is precisely what 
Napster's MusicShare software does.  Given the facial applicability of the statute, one may 
ask why Napster did not press, and the court did not decide, whether section 512(d) applied 
to Napster.  Moreover, section 512 is an Act of Congress, fashioned through business-to-
business negotiations, that was supposed to serve as the blueprint for determining the rights 
and responsibilities of information intermediaries in the networked, digital era.  And, if the 
section had been found to apply, the Ninth Circuit's discretion in instructing the trial court 
regarding injunctive relief would have been greatly circumscribed.133 Notwithstanding 
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<<31>> the potentially outcome-determinative effect of section 512(d), and the apparent 
intent of Congress to anticipate and legislate the outcomes of cases such as this, the Ninth 
Circuit chose to defer interpretation of Congress's resolution of issues such as those raised in 
Napster and chose instead to rely on its common law approach to the case.134 
 
   What is even more perplexing is that the decision regarding section 512 would not 
have been particularly difficult - at least on the surface.  To qualify for section 512(d) 
protection, a service provider must act expeditiously to remove access to an online location 
if the service provider has actual knowledge that the target material is infringing or if the 
service provider becomes "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent."135  Had the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the potential applicability of section 
512(d) when discussing contributory infringement, the court would have held the safe 
harbor inapplicable for the same reason that the court found contributory infringement - 
Napster had actual knowledge of infringing activity.136 
 
   By avoiding adjudication of the section 512(d) issue, however, the Ninth Circuit 
avoided a number of troubling interpretive issues lurking in section 512, and this seems to 
have been the court's motivation for leaving section 512 jurisprudence undeveloped.  The 
source of much of the trouble is that the section 512 safe harbors are limitations on liability, 
but it is not clear what theory of service provider liability is being limited.  For example, 
section 512(d) provides a limitation on liability arising when the service provider "links users 
to an online location containing infringing material or infringing activity, by using 
information location tools, including a <<32>> directory, index, reference, pointer or 
hypertext link."137  It is highly doubtful that a service provider could be held liable as a direct 
                                                                                                                                                 
infringing activity and is identified in the order, by terminating the accounts of the subscriber or account holder 
that are specified in the order; (iii) Such other injunctive relief as the court may consider necessary to prevent or 
restrain infringement of copyrighted material specified in the order of the court at a particular online location, if 
such relief is the least burdensome to the service provider among the forms of relief comparably effective for 
that purpose.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
  Section 512(j) does not distinguish between the scope of preliminary and permanent injunctions.  See 
17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).  One could argue that the subsection (j) limitations do not apply to 
preliminary injunctions because the subsection limits relief only after the court has determined that the "service 
provider is not subject to monetary remedies under this section."  Id.  If that is the proper interpretation of 
subsection (j), then the Ninth Circuit was free to leave for another day whether Napster would qualify for the § 
512(d) limitation on monetary liability. 
134 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
135 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(1)(A)-(C) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
136 See Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1020.  Knowing that it was vulnerable to proof of actual knowledge, Napster had 
urged that it fit within the § 512(a) safe harbor, which applies even if the service provider has knowledge of 
infringement.  See id. at 1025.  Section 512(a) protects against monetary liability for infringement "by reason of 
the provider's transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, material through a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider." 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). In a separate 
opinion, the district court had denied Napster's motion for summary judgment on its § 512(a) defense.  See 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000). 
137 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 




infringer for most linking activities.138  The more likely interpretation is that Congress 
intended to limit liability for contributory infringement.  The language Congress chose, 
however, is in tension with that intent.  Section 512(d) is unavailable to a service provider 
that has actual or constructive knowledge of infringing activity at the target "online 
location."139  The knowledge provision poses the possibility that section 512(d) is mere 
surplusage.  If the only viable theory of infringement that section 512(d) might limit is 
contributory infringement, then the plaintiff will have shown that a service provider had 
actual or constructive knowledge of infringement.  But, if the plaintiff has made that 
showing, section 512(d) is unavailable, so it provides no limit at all.140 Alternatively, there is 
one level of knowledge applicable in order to make the service provider contributorily liable, 
and another level of knowledge to limit that liability under section 512(d).141  
Understandably, given the record before the Ninth Circuit, the court chose not to engage in 
nuanced analysis of issues such as these. 
 
   One last point on the Ninth Circuit's treatment of section 512: The court made a 
very curious statement that plaintiffs had raised a "serious question" as to "whether Napster 
is an Internet service provider as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)."142  The term "service 
provider" is not defined in section 512(d); the definition is in section 512(k)(1)(B).143 And, it 
is hard to see what the "serious question" is on this point.  Under any reasonable 
interpretation, Napster undoubtedly provides "online services."144 
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court expressed some doubt upon this score.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 573136 *3 & 
n.5 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000). 




<<33>>III. Questions from the Audience 
 
  Attendee: Mike, what is the liability of the venture capitalists that backed Napster? 
 
 Carroll: Good question. At this point, the venture capitalists haven't been sued, but, 
conceivably, under a theory of contributory infringement you could say that supplying the 
money is a material contribution to the infringement that's going on, and if you have 
knowledge that you are funding infringing activity, you are liable.  Or, if the VC takes a 
control stake in the company, then the corporate form is no shield, and there's potential 
liability under a vicarious infringement theory.  There's a question in the back. 
 
   Attendee: [What about a Napster-like program that spreads like] any virus that's out 
there, [if it is released by] somebody who is obviously [not trying to] make money on the 
program? 
 
   Carroll: Well, that's one of the things, that's an interesting question, and it depends 
on what the software does.  Napster keeps an ongoing relationship with you, so the court 
was able to find control in the terms of that relationship. But if you create software in such a 
way that you just put it out there, and you have no ongoing relationship with people who use 
the software, or at least no relationship that gives you control over users' infringing activities, 
then the copyright owners will not be able to meet the control prong of that standard.  And 
again, the direct financial benefit - even under the broad reading of that standard in this case 
- you're right.  It's possible that a copyright owner could not meet this standard if the 
programmer has adopted this "information wants to be free" approach to the program. 
Which is why there's going to have to be some kind of solution, because even with the 
precedent established in Napster, the recording industry has very slippery control over digital 
distribution of music at this point. 
 
   Attendee: Mike I think I can add further to that ... you're asking the question about 
you know if it doesn't make money - why is it bad?  Well, it's not just that ... that's only part 
of it.  Maybe Napster or companies like it don't make money by distributing music, but who 
loses money are my clients and Ken's companies and his artists <<34>> who make our 
livings by controlling distribution of this property which we own. 
 
   Attendee: [What about the benefits of increased notoriety and no reduction in] their 
sales [under Napster]? 
 
   Attendee: [Sales] should have gone up more ... they were diluted severely by 
someone like Napster. 
 
   Carroll: Let me just jump in and say, I think one of the problems is that we don't 
really know the full economic story of what the effect of Napster is. There's evidence going a 




lot of different ways.  Clearly there is sampling use, there's testimony to the effect that 
people who sample music on Napster now get hooked on new music and are spending more 
on music than they would have otherwise.  Or they're going out to see bands that they would 
not have gone to see, or they're buying T-shirts ... so there are a lot of increases in revenue 
from other revenue streams.  On the other hand, there's pretty good evidence that some 
people are downloading and not buying music that they might have otherwise bought. 
 
   And again you've got the Metallicas out there in the world.  Even if you don't give 
them much sympathy, you've got the independent musicians who are trying to self-publish, 
who see this new cheap distribution channel becoming potentially useless to them because 
all the music may get swept away immediately.  So it's a very complex economic story in 
terms of figuring out who wins and who loses with Napster, and I think that's one of the 
problems, and one of the things the court's opinion really wasn't as sensitive to as it should 
have been.  There's no recognition about how exciting this technology is from the 
consumer's perspective in the opinion.  It's a very bare bones, dry application of legal 
doctrine to a very complex new social and economic development. 
